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A TALE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE HEARTLAND:




I have come to view international law as an exercise in the art of
storytelling. These stories involve clusters of transnational actors - public
and private, federal, state and local - in complex plots with undulating
twists and turns. We have heard some on this panel discuss one
increasingly important dimension of these stories - the U.S. Supreme
Court as a participant in transnational legal conversation, or transnational
judicial dialogue. With the Court's citations of foreign and international
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law; Yale Law School (J.D.,
1994); Yale University (M.A., 1994); Princeton University (A.B., 1990). 1 am indebted to
Paul Schiff Berman, Lyn Entzeroth, Lou Kohiman, Tamara Piety, and Melissa Waters for
invaluable insights and suggestions and to Harold Hongju Koh for ongoing mentorship,
guidance and inspiration. This essay is based on my remarks at The Supreme Court,
Constitutional Courts and the Role of International Law in Constitutional Jurisprudence,
Panel at The Supreme Court's 2003-04 Term: Building Bridges or Constructing Barriers
Between National, Foreign, and International Law? (University of Tulsa College of Law,
October 29, 2004). On December 10, 1994, the Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ
of certiorari in Medellfn v. Dretke, 125 S.Ct. 686 (mem.) (2004), a case which raises issues
substantially similar to those posed in Torres. The author recognizes that the Court's
forthcoming decision in Medellin will inevitably bear on some of the analysis and discussion
herein, but offers this essay in the spirit of the Symposium and its focus on the Supreme
Court's treatment of international law during the 2003 Term.
1. See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation: Unidirectional Monologue or Co-Constitutive Dialogue?, 12 TULSA J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 149 (2004) (remarks in this issue) [herinafter Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of
Foreign Law].
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
law in high profile cases such as Grutter v. Bollinger and Lawrence v.
Texas3 in the 2002 Term, and the Court's anticipated use of foreign and
international law in Roper v. Simmons4 this Term, the Supreme Court has
begun more actively engaging its foreign counterparts in an international
legal constitutive process. Within the judiciary, however, the Supreme
Court is not the sole, or even the leading, transnational actor - lower
federal courts certainly play an important role.5 Even less appreciated is
the role of state courts. During this past Term, one of the more significant
international-law-related decisions involved a case that the Supreme Court
passed on, thereby leaving the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
particularly Judge Charles Chapel, as a lead participant. This is the story
that I will focus on here.
II. THE TORRES STORY AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR
RELATIONS
A. Plot 1: Torres and the State of Oklahoma
The story I would like to tell involves two plots that unfolded
concurrently. The first plot begins on the ground, in the state courts of
Oklahoma. The case is Torres v. State of Oklahoma.' In 1993, Oklahoma
law enforcement authorities arrested Mr. Torres, a Mexican national,
charging him with murder.' An Oklahoma court convicted Torres and
sentenced him to death.' On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of CriminalS . 9
Appeals affirmed Torres' conviction and denied several claims for post-
conviction relief, none of which included any international law-related
2. 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
3. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
4. 124 S. Ct. 2198 (mem.) (2004).
5. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. 962 P.2d 3 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (describing facts in the case).
7. Id.
8. Torres was tried with Jorge Ochoa for first degree murder with malice aforethought,
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (1976), and first degree burglary, OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1431
(1979). The first trial resulted in a hung jury. Oklahoma retried the case, and each
defendant was found guilty of two counts of murder with malice aforethought and one
count of first-degree burglary. See Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2003).
The jury found that there were two aggravating circumstances in Torres' case and thus
sentenced Torres to death. Id. at 1150. The two aggravating circumstances were: 1) the
probability that Torres would again commit a crime and thus be a "continuing threat to
society," and 2) "Mr. Torres knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one
person." Id.
9. Torres, 962 P.2d at 26.
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claims. Soon thereafter, Torres filed a habeas petition in federal court,
requesting relief for, among other things, the Oklahoma authorities' failure
to accord him protections under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Vienna Convention), namely their failure to inform him of his
right to have the detaining officials contact the Mexican consulate if he so
wished.1 The federal courts denied habeas relief on the Vienna
Convention issues, 12 applying Oklahoma's procedural default rules" and
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's admonition not to
14grant habeas relief unless the claimant proves prejudice. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari on November 17, 2003,"5 but two Justices, as I will
discuss in a few minutes, wrote separately on the Vienna Convention
issues in the shadow of a concurrent plot unfolding in the Hague.
10. See Torres v. Oklahoma, 58 P.3d 214 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
11. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to
nationals of the sending State: ... (b) if he so requests, the competent
authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that
State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is
detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said
authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights
under this sub-paragraph.
Id,
12. Torres v. Gibson, No. CIV-99-155-R (W.D. Okla. 2000) (unpublished memorandum
and order); Torres v. Mullin, 317 F.3d at 1148 n.1 (2003) (technically, the district court and
10th Circuit did not issue a certificate of appealability on the Vienna Convention claims).
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1089(D) (1987).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) & (e) (amendments effective Apr. 24, 1996). "[W]ith respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence." Id at § 2254(d)(2).
15. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919 (mem.) (2003).
16. See Torres, 124 S. Ct. 919 (mem.) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting the denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari); Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (mem.) (Bryer, J.,
dissenting from the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari). See infra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Justice Stevens' opinion regarding the denial of
the petition for a writ of certiorari and Justice Breyer's dissent from the denial of the
petition for a writ of certiorari.
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B. Plot 2: The International Court of Justice
Far away from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, Netherlands, a second
plot was unfolding that would have consequences for the Torres case. This
plot opened with heady questions of international law and diplomacy,
rather than the intricate, fact-specific questions of a first-degree murder
trial., Yet, just as in Torres' story, the Vienna Convention provides the
landscape.
At issue in a series of ICJ cases was the United States' failure to grant
detained foreign nationals their Vienna Convention rights. The pertinent
Vienna Convention provisions may be divided into three categories: rights,
obligations, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Under the Vienna
Convention, detaining officials must inform a detained foreign national
"without delay" of his right to request that his consulate be informed of his
• 18
detention; and foreign consulates must be free to communicate with, visit,
and/or arrange legal representation for foreign nationals.19 State parties to
the Convention are obligated to give "full effect" to the aforementioned
rights." Most significantly for Torres, an Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention (Optional Protocol), which the United States not only ratified
but also drafted (and championed)," annoints the ICJ as the venue to
17. Legal scholars have well-documented this plot and the purpose of this essay is not to
repeat the thorough analysis of others. See, e.g., Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International
Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1731 (2003); Linda E. Carter, Compliance with ICJ Provisional
Measures and the Meaning of Review and Reconsideration Under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations: Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
117 (2003); Alan Macina, Avena & Other Mexican Nationals: The Litmus for LaGrand &
the Future of Consular Rights in the United States, 34 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 115 (2003).
18. Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 36(1)(b).
19. Id. at art. 36(l)(a) & (c).
20. Id. at art. 36(2).
21. Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention Concerning the Compulsory Settlement
of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
The United States Senate ratified the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol on
October 12, 1969, and President Nixon proclaimed the treaty's entry into force on January
29, 1970, 115 CONG. REC. 30,997 (1969), 21 U.S.T. 77, 373. See also Report of the United
States Delegation to the Vienna Conference on Consular Relations, reprinted in Sen. Exec.
E. 91st Cong., 1st Sess., May 8, 1969, at 41-59-61. Interestingly, the United States was the
first country to bring a case to the ICJ under the Optional Protocol, see United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7; 1980 I.C.J. 3,
5, 24-26. Judge Chapel also notes, "The United States... has consistently looked to the
International Court of Justice for binding decisions in international treaty disputes,
including those brought under the Vienna Convention." Torres v. Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-
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consider all "[d]isputes arising out of the interpretation or application" of
21the Convention.
1. Breard (Paraguay v. United States)
With this background, the first chapter in the ICJ's Vienna
Convention story involves a 1998 case that Paraguay filed against the
United States. In 1993, the State of Virginia convicted Mr. Breard, a
Paraguayan national, of attempted rape and capital murder and soon
thereafter sentenced him to death 3 Paraguay argued in its April 3, 1998
ICJ petition that the United States violated the Vienna Convention on
account of the Virginia authorities' failure to notify Breard of his right to
contact the Paraguayan consulate; consequently, Virginia should, among
other things, stay the scheduled April 14, 1998 execution pending an ICJ
decision on the merits of Paraguay's case.24 Like Torres, Breard had been
procedurally barred from raising the Vienna Convention issues in his
21habeas proceedings. On April 9, just five days before the scheduled
execution, the ICJ issued a provisional order, asking the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal" to prevent Breard from being executed
pending an ICJ decision on the substantive Vienna Convention claims."
In response to a subsequent habeas petition and application for a stay
of execution, the U.S. Supreme Court held per curium that the ICJ's
provisional order would not trump either state or federal procedural
default rules; the Court also found that even if Virginia's procedural
442 at 2 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (order granting stay of execution and remanding
case for evidentiary hearing) (on file with author).
22. Optional Protocol, supra note 21, art. I.
23. Breard v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 445 S.E.2d 670,673 (Va. 1994).
24. In fact, Paraguay asked for the following relief on the merits:
"(1) any criminal liability imposed on Angel Francisco Breard in violation
of international legal obligations is void, and should be recognized as void
by the legal authorities of the United States;
(2) the United States should restore the status quo ante, that is, re-
establish the situation that existed before the detention of, proceedings
against, and conviction and sentencing of Paraguay's national in violation
of the United States' international legal obligations took place; and
(3) the United States should provide Paraguay a guarantee of the non-
repetition of the illegal acts."
Order, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Case Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Rclations (Para. v. U.S.), I.C.J. 99, 5 (Apr. 9, 1998), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ipaus/ipausframe.htm (last visited on Nov. 23, 2004)
[hereinafter Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures].
25. Id. at $ 3; see also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
26. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 24.
2004]
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default rules had permitted the Vienna Convention claim to proceed,
Breard was not prejudiced by the Vienna Convention breach and thus
would not have been granted relief.27 Virginia executed Breard on April
14, 1998, and Paraguay thereafter requested that the case be removed from
the ICJ's docket.28
2. LaGrand (Germany v. United States)
The second chapter of this plot begins on March 2, 1999, when
Germany instituted ICJ proceedings against the United States on behalf of
29Walter and Karl LaGrand. The LaGrands were German nationals
convicted in Arizona of first degree murder, attempted armed robbery and
kidnapping. As in Breard's case, law enforcement officials did not inform
the LaGrands of their rights under the Vienna Convention until ten years
following their arrest, long after their direct appeals and petitions for post-
conviction relief had run their course in the Arizona state courts. When
the LaGrands raised their Vienna Convention rights in their habeas corpus
proceedings, the federal courts concluded that the LaGrands were
procedurally barred from doing so.31 Karl LaGrand was executed on
February 24, 1999, prompting Germany to file its ICJ petition on March 2,
1999. Nonetheless, Walter LaGrand was executed on March 3, 1999
despite the ICJ issuing a provisional order asking the United States to
"take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not
executed" pending a final ICJ decision, despite efforts on the part
German and U.S. diplomats to intervene,33 and despite the Arizona Parole
Board's recommendation that the execution be stayed for 60 days in light
14
of the ICJ case.
Unlike Paraguay, Germany decided to proceed with its ICJ case on
the merits. The ICJ ultimately concluded that Arizona's procedural
default rules violated the Vienna Convention because their application
27. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
28. Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 99 (Discontinuance Order of Nov. 10).
29. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 104, T 14, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus-ijudgment_20010625.htm (last visited on
Nov. 23,2004).
30. Id. at$ [119-22.
31. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 971 (1998).
32. Order, Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Case Concerning the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 104, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (last visited on Dec. 11, 2004).
33. LaGrand Case, supra note 29, at T 26.
34. Id. at 131.
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precluded defendants from challenging their sentences even though the
state officers had not informed them of their consular protections.35
Because the ICJ decision followed the LaGrand executions, the U.S.
Supreme Court had no direct opportunity to rebuke or accept this holding
in a habeas petition or a petition to stay an execution.
C. Avena and the Convergence of the Plots
Thus, we come to the next chapter and the place where our disparate
plot lines begin to converge. On January 9, 2003, Mexico, on behalf of
some 50 Mexican nationals on death row in various U.S. states, filed a
Vienna Convention case against the United States in the ICJ.36 Torres was
one of these Mexican nationals. The ICJ, relying heavily on LaGrand,
concluded that the United States, in its arrest, detention, trial and
sentencing of the Mexican nationals, had violated its obligations under the
Vienna Convention, most egregiously in its failure to notify these foreign
• 31
nationals of their right to contact the Mexican consulate,.
35. Id. at 74, 90-91. This was the case regardless of whether the detainee "would have
sought consular assistance ... whether Germany would have rendered such assistance, or
whether a different verdict would have been rendered." Id. at 74.
36. Application Instituting Proceedings, Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128, available at
http://www.ij-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus-iapplication-20030109.PDF
(last visited on Dec. 11, 2004). The original claim related to 54 Mexican nations, but as a
result of Mexico making subsequent adjustments to its claim, the ICJ's decision only deal
with the cases of 52 Mexican nationals, with criminal proceedings taking place in the
following states between 1979 and the present: California (twenty-eight cases), Texas
(fifteen cases), Illinois (three cases), Arizona (one case), Arkansas (one case), Nevada (one
case), Ohio (one case), Oklahoma (one case) and Oregon (one case). Case Concerning
Avena and Other Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 2004 I.C.J. 128, available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusframe.htm (last visited Dec. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Case
Concerning Avena]. For an excellent summary of the Avena decision, see Dinah Shelton,
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 559
(2004).
37. The Court noted that the rights in Article 36(1) are intertwined - when a receiving
state does not notify detainees of their Vienna Convention rights, it is hard to imagine how
these detainees would then request that the consulate be informed, Vienna Convention, art.
36(1)(b), and how the consulate would then communicate with nationals, Vienna
Convention, art. 3 6(1)(a) or visit nationals and arrange for representation, Vienna
Convention, art. 36(1)(c). The Court actually examined facts specific to each of the fifty-
two cases and determined that in one case, the United States had not breached its
obligations under art. 36(1)(b) to inform the detainee of his Vienna Convention rights,
(case no. 22 - Mr. Salcido); and that in three cases the United States had not breached its
obligations under 36(1)(b) to notify the consulate of the detention if the detainee so
requests (case no. 22 - Mr. Salcido; case no. 10 - Mr. Juirez; case no. 34 - Mr. Hernandez).
Case Concerning Avena, supra note 36, at para. 60. The ICJ also concluded that the
2004]
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What, according to the ICJ, was the appropriate remedy for such
violations? While Mexico argued that the conviction and sentences in all
of the cases should be annulled,38 the ICJ determined, as it had in
LaGrand, that the U.S. need only afford "review and reconsideration" to
determine the extent to which each particular defendant had been
prejudiced by the respective Vienna Convention violations. 9 The ICJ
further concluded that procedural default rules, virtually the same rules
that were under scrutiny in LaGrand, violate the Vienna Convention to
the extent that they preclude such "review and reconsideration." 40 The
clemency process, according to the ICJ, is an inadequate "review and
reconsideration" remedy." Thus, in the case of Torres, the JCJ ordered
United States had violated Article 36(1)(a) in denying Mexican consular officials
meaningful opportunity "to communicate with and have access to their nationals," as well
as its obligation in Article 36(1)(c) regarding the right of consular officers to visit their
detained nationals and arrange for legal representation (although the ICJ only found
violations of the right to arrange for legal representation in 34 of the 54 cases). Id at para.
106.
38. Case Concerning Avena, supra note 36, at para. 14.
39. Id. at para. 139. "[W]hat is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is the
existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the
rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such
review and reconsideration." Id.
40. Id. Specifically, the ICJ stated that procedural default rules "may continue to prevent
courts from attaching legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation of rights set
forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Mexico, in a timely fashion, from retaining
private counsel for certain nationals and otherwise assisting in their defence." Id. at para.
113. To the extent that procedural default rules preclude "review and reconsideration"
when a receiving state, in this case the United States, denies detainees Vienna Convention
protections, such procedural default rules violate Article 36(2) of the Vienna Convention,
which requires that states, through local law, give "full effect" to the "purposes for which
the rights accorded under this Article [Article 36] are intended." Vienna Convention, art.
36(2).
41. Case Concerning Avena, supra note 36. This is a particularly relevant conclusion in
the context of Torres' case. Oklahoma confronted a similar case in 2001 - the case of
Gerardo Valdez, a Mexican national who was convicted of murder in 1989 and sentenced to
death without having been informed of his consular rights. While Mr. Valdez was on death
row, the ICJ decided the LaGrand case, and the Mexican government took up the cause of
Mr. Valdez's case and conviction. In Valdez's case, the Oklahoma courts applied the
procedural default rules to preclude review for prejudice flowing from the State of
Oklahoma's failure to notify Mr. Valdez of his rights under article 36(1) of the Vienna
Convention. Valdez v. Oklahoma, 46 P.3d 703, 709 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002). While the
Oklahoma Parole Board voted 3 to 1 to commute the death sentence, see Brooke A.
Masters, U.S. Deprived Mexican of Fair Trial, Appeal Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2001, at
A8, Governor Keating nonetheless denied clemency, after staying the execution three
times. Press Release, Governor Denies Clemency for Convicted Killer (July 20, 2001) (on
file with author). In a letter that the Governor sent to Mexico's President, Vicente Fox, the
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the U.S. to "find an appropriate remedy having the nature of review and
reconsideration."42
On March 2, 2004, while Arena was pending and with full knowledge
that Torres' case was one of the cases that Mexcio challenged in its ICJ
petition, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals set Torres' execution
date for May 18, 2004."3 The ICJ issued the Avena decision on March 31,
2004, with obvious implications for Torres, sparking a flurry of high-
profile, high-intensity legal activity surrounding his particular case." On
May 7, 2004, the Parole Board recommended clemency for Torres, with a
vote of 3-2.45 On May 13, 2004, just five days before Torres' scheduled
Governor supports his decision, and reconciles it with the LaGrand decision, arguing that
he actually conducted the requisite "review and reconsideration" during the clemency
proceedings:
While it is true that Mr. Valdez was not notified of his right to contact the
Mexican Consulate in clear violation of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, that violation, while regretful and
inexcusable, does not, in and of itself, establish clearly discernible
prejudice or that a different conclusion would have been reached at trial
or on appeal of Mr. Valdez's conviction or sentence. I must, therefore,
look to the specific materials and arguments to judge whether justice was
done in this case .... I find that the failure to comply with Article 36 did
not have a prejudicial effect on either the final determination of guilt or
the sentence imposed in this case.
Id. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately remanded Mr. Valdez's case, not
for Vienna Convention violations but rather for "ineffective assistance of counsel" that led
to a "miscarriage of justice." See Valdez, 46 P.3d at 710-12. While the Vienna Convention
claim did not prevail, the Court of Criminal Appeals importantly effccted the same result
by remanding for resentencing on other grounds.
42. Case Concerning Avena, supra note 36, at para. 152. The ICJ nonetheless recognized
that in most of the cases before it there were still open avenues of appeal that could,
potentially, create opportunities for the type of "review and reconsideration" that the
Vienna Convention demands. It also noted that these "review and reconsideration"
opportunities had been foreclosed in three cases and that, in those cases, the U.S. had not
only breached its article 36(1) notification obligations but also article 36(2)'s mandate that
state parties use local law to "give effect" to the Convention's rights and underlying
purposes. One of these three cases was that of Torres.
43. See Torres, 58 P.3d 214. The Court of Criminal Appeals set the execution date despite
a recommendation on the part of the Attorney General that the Court of Criminal Appeals
defer pending the ICJ's decision.
44. See infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Julie E. Bisbee, Okla. Panel Backs Clemency for Mexican Inmate: State Feels
Heat of Court Ruling, COM. APPEAL, May 8, 2004, at A4 ( "Susan B. Loving, chairwoman of
the board, said Torres's rights under the Vienna Convention were violated. She said that
the board will let a higher authority determine what bearing the world court ruling has on
Torres's case. 'We'll let the governor make this decision."'). See also Sean Murphy,
Implementation of Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98 AM. J. INTL L. 581 (2004).
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execution, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, by a 3-2 decision,
stayed the execution and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to
determine, in part, whether Torres was "prejudiced by the State's violation
of his Vienna Convention rights., 46 Acting under the cover of the Court of
Criminal Appeals decision, as well as the decision of the Parole Board, the
Governor commuted Torres' sentence to life in prison without parole later
that day.
In a special, unpublished concurrence, Judge Chapel offered his view
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' legal obligations in the wake
of the Avena decision. Judge Chapel reasoned that the United States
freely and consensually signed and ratified the Vienna Convention,
including the Optional Protocol, creating binding, contract-like legal
obligations between the United States and other State Parties.4 ' By virtue
of the Supremacy Clause,49 the Court of Criminal Appeals "is bound by the
Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol" and is obligated "to give
effect" to both.0 The Avena decision, as a "product of the process set
forth in the Optional Protocol" likewise deserves the Court of Criminal
Appeals' "full faith and credit."5 Judge Chapel thereby concludes that his
court should "review and reconsider" Torres' case "in light of the Vienna
Convention violation, without recourse to procedural bar.
52
46. Torres v. State of Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004)
(order granting stay of execution and remanding the case for evidentiary hearing).
47. Press Release, State of Oklahoma Office of Governor Brad Henry, Gov. Henry
Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), at
http://www.governor.state.ok.us/display article.php?article-id=301&article-type=l (last
visited on Dec. 11, 2004) [hereinafter Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate
Torres]:
The International Court of Justice ruled on March 31 that Torres' rights
were violated because he had not been told about his rights guaranteed by
the 1963 Vienna Convention. Under agreements entered into by the
United States, the ruling of the ICJ is binding on U.S. courts. "I took into
account the fact that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention and is
part of that treaty," the Governor said. "In addition, the U.S. State
Department contacted my office and urged us to give 'careful
consideration' to that fact."
Id.
48. Torres v. State of Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, at 6 (Chapel, J., concurring).
49. The Supremacy Clause explicitly states that "[t]reaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. Torres, No. PCD-442 at 3, 5 (Chapel, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id. at 8. The "review and reconsider[ation]" will evaluate Torres' case for prejudice,
asking: 1) did Torres know that he had a right to contact the Mexican consulate?; 2) would
[Vol. 12:1
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In response to those who believe that deference to the Avena decision
is tantamount to granting the ICJ jurisdiction and diminishing autonomy of
the Oklahoma courts," Judge Chapel noted:
I am not suggesting that the International Court of Justice has
jurisdiction over this Court - far from it. However, in these unusual
circumstances the issue of whether this Court must abide by that court's
opinion in Torres's case is not ours to determine. The United States
Senate and the President have made that decision for us. The Optional
Protocol.... provides that the International Court of Justice is the1 4
forum for resolution of disputes under the Vienna Convention.
Torres have availed himself of this right?; and 3) would the consulate have assisted Torres?
Id. at 9. Judge Chapel thereby adopts the analysis that other lower courts have adopted in
determining prejudice in the face of Vienna Convention violations. See People v. Preciado-
Flores, 66 P.3d 155, 161 (Colo. App. 2002); Zavala v. State, 739 N.E.2d 135, 142 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000); State v. Cevallos-Bermeo, 754 A.2d 1224, 1227 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. 111. 1999);
United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1998); United States v. Villa-
Fabela, 882 F.2d 434, 440 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Proa-
Tovar, 975 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1992). Judge Chapel concludes that Torres may have been
prejudiced by the state's violation of the Vienna Convention and thus avidly supports the
court in its decision to remand.
I have concluded that there is a possibility a significant miscarriage of
justice occurred, as shown by Torres's claims, specifically: that the
violation of his Vienna Convention rights contributed to trial counsel's
ineffectiveness, that the jury did not hear significant evidence, and that
the result of the trial is unreliable.
Torres, No. PCD-04-442 at 12 (Chapel, J., concurring).
53. Torres v. State of Oklahoma, No. PCD-04-442, at 2 (Lumpkin, J. dissenting) ("I also
do not find Avena ... binding on this Court."). At the same time, the dissenters argue that
Torres has been afforded rights under Avena, that the U.S. must provide review and
reconsideration, implying that Avena is relevant to the Court of Criminal Appeals' analysis.
Id. at 4. "Without a doubt Appellant has been afforded his rights under Avena" and
quoting paragraph 152 of the Avena decision, where the ICJ delineates its holding,
requiring the United States to provide "review and reconsideration," but disagrees with the
ICJ regarding the form that the review and reconsideration must take. Id. "He has been
represented by competent lawyers at each stage of these proceedings and afforded all the
rights guaranteed to citizens of the United States." Id. But see, Kim Cobb, Parole Board
Votes to Spare Life of Mexican, Hous. CHRON., May 8,2004, at 3:
Some officials in Texas, where 16 Mexican citizens sit on death row, have
said the decision by the United Nations' highest court would not be
enforced in the state. "Obviously," Robert Black, a spokesman for Gov.
Rick Perry, said at the time of the ruling, "the governor respects the world
court's right to have an opinion, but the fact remains they have no
standing and no jurisdiction in the state of Texas."
54. Torres, No. PCD-04-442, at 5 (Chapel, J., concurring).
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In the first test to the Avena decision, the Oklahoma court accommodated
the ICJ's legal conclusions.
III. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS, JUDICIAL CONVERSATION, AND
THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS
The story recounted above has three broader implications for the way
that scholars and practitioners conceive of international law and
lawmaking: 1) it reminds that the Supreme Court is, at times, a cautious,
hesitant, participant in an iterative transnational judicial conversation; 2) it
illustrates the process-oriented nature of international lawmaking; and 3) it
illuminates state courts as important transnational actors.
A. U.S. Supreme Court and Judicial Global Conversation
Particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court's citations of foreign
and international law in the Grutter v. Bollinger and Lawrence v. Texas
cases during the 2002 October Term, it has become rather fashionable to
celebrate the Supreme Court's public emergence as a transnational actor
on the international stage.5 Consequently, the concept of global judicial
conversation and discourse, of Justices importing foreign ideas into their
jurisprudence, has become rather vogue (or for some, most notably Justice
Scalia, a lightning rod) 6 The Torres case reminds us that the Supreme
55. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L
L. 43 (2004) (noting how the Court uses foreign and international law, and separating out
these usages in terms of "parallel rules," "empirical light," and "community standard")
[hereinafter International Law as Part of Our Law]; see generally Janet Koven Levit, Going
Public with Transnational Law: The 2002-2003 Supreme Court Term, 39 TULSA L. REV. 155
(2003); Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Citing More Foreign Cases, USA TODAY, July 8,
2003, at A-09 (noting that "the Supreme Court's reference to foreign law in [Lawrence v.
Texas] stood out as if it were in bold print and capital letters"); Linda Greenhouse, In a
Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, 152 N.Y. TIMES, July 1 2003, at
Al (noting that the Court "displayed a new attentiveness to legal developments in the rest
of the world and to the court's role in keeping the United States in step with them"); Gina
Holland, Justices Use Guidance from Foreign Courts, CHI. SuN-TMES, Aug. 3, 2003, at 25;
Charles Lane, Thinking Outside the U.S., WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2003, at A13 (noting that the
court's "decision-making is beginning to reflect the influence of international legal norms,
as well as rulings by courts in foreign countries"); Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Opening Up
to World Opinion, 26 LEGAL TIMES 1 (2003) (describing this Term's "significance" in terms
of a "newfound interest in invoking the rulings and views of foreign courts and
international authorities" and quoting Professor Harold Koh describing the Term as
"breakthrough .... The veil has been lifted. The ostrich's head came out of the sand.").
56. See Melissa Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 92 GEo. L.J. (forthcoming, 2004);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INTL. L.J. 191,194-206
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Court is sometimes a shy, reserved and tentative participant in this global
conversation - it often does not assume a prominent and leading role,
ceding the honor to other actors, in this case the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals. Torres also reminds us that the Court's role in this
global judicial conversation may not always be showcased in banner
headline cases, but will sometimes remain buried in obscure footnotes or
commentary following a denial of a certiorari petition, as regularly had
been the case prior to Grutter and Lawrence. 5'7
While some Justices would have liked to engage the international
issues that Torres presented, namely the relationship between domestic
law and the ICJ's interpretation of a binding treaty issued pursuant to a
binding dispute resolution mechanism, the Court as a whole did not
embrace the Torres case as an opportunity to engage in such global judicial
conversation. On November 17, 2003, in the face of a provisional ICJ
order in Avena requiring that "[t]he United States... take all measures
necessary to ensure that Mr. Cesar Robert Fierro Reyna, Mr. Roberto
Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not executed, 58 the
(2003) (discussing transnational judicial conversation and dialogue and its impact on
Supreme Court jurisprudence); see also Waters, Justice Scalia on the Use of Foreign Law,
supra note 1 (discussing Justice Scalia's strong opposition to the use of foreign and
international interpretations and applications of rights similar to those provided for in the
Constitution); see also Discussion between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen
Breyer, Constitutional Relevance of Foreign Court Decisions, American University
Washingon College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), available at
http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf (last visited on Jan. 24, 2005).
57. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) ("Moreover, within the
world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 851 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that capital punishment for those under
eighteen years is, in many circumstances, inconsistent with U.S. treaty obligations); Knight
v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(arguing that the Court should consider the issue of whether a prolonged stay on death row
implicates the Eighth Amendment, observing that "[a] growing number of courts outside
the United States -- courts that accept or assume the lawfulness of the death penalty -- have
held that lengthy delay in administering a lawful death penalty renders ultimate execution
inhuman, degrading, or unusually cruel"); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77
(1997) (Breyer & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (looking to federal systems in Germany,
Switzerland, and the European Union to support position that "the United States is not the
only nation that seeks to reconcile the practical need for a central authority with the
democratic virtues of more local control"); Printz, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that foreign country practice provides empirical data of how other
countries regulate handguns, in particular, balancing federal regulation against local
control).
58. Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, Case Concerning Avena and
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U. S.), 2003 I.C.J. 128 (Feb. 5) (order), available at
2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
U.S. Supreme Court nonetheless denied the petition for a writ of certiorari
in Torres' habeas proceedings.59 Consequently, the Supreme Court chose
not to assume affirmative authorship of the Vienna Convention stories that
both Oklahoma and the ICJ were concurrently writing. It passed, gave up
its place, at least during the 2003 Term, in the global conversation among
international courts, federal courts, and state courts (and between those in
the U.S. State Department concerned with the diplomatic integrity of
treaty obligations and future credibility of the U.S. in treaty negotiations
and those state and local officials fighting to maximize autonomy over law
enforcement decisions). In so doing, the Court assumed a "nationalist"
posture, as opposed to the "transnationalist" approach celebrated by manyS• 60
of this Symposium's participants.
Yet, this pass did not come without some resistance by Justices
Stevens and Breyer. In a memorandum decision attached to the denial of
certiorari, Justice Stevens notes that the LaGrand decision is the
"authoritative interpretation" of the Vienna Convention's consular
notification rights and obligations and argues that "[a]pplying the
procedural default rule to Article 36 claims is not only in direct violation of
the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly unfair."61 Justice Stevens
adds that "when it [procedural default rules] permits state courts to
disregard the Nation's treaty obligations," such rules are unfaithful to the
62Supremacy Clause.
Justice Breyer dissents from the denial of Torres' certiorari petition,
offering the following analysis. The Supremacy Clause demands that
states give full effect, without "additional congressional legislation" to the
http:/iwww.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imuslimusorder/imus iorder-20030205.PDF (last
visited Nov. 25,2004).
59. Torres, 124 S. Ct. at 919. The Supreme Court certainly had other options at this point.
It could have imposed a stay pending the outcome of the Avena case, or the Court could
have granted the petition for certiorari and heard arguments on the nagging federalism and
Supremacy Clause questions that hover around issues of treaty implementation, e.g., to
what extent are the states bound to comply with the terms of a treaty even if
implementation requires passing and enforcing laws that are contrary to longstanding state
law and practice?
60. See, e.g., (remarks in this issue, discussing the Supreme Court's transnationalist
posture). But see Eric Posner, Transnational Legal Process and the Supreme Court's 2003-
2004 Term: Some Skeptical Observations, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 23 (2004) (remarks
in this issue questioning the extent to which the Supreme Court is, or should become, more
transnationalist in its outlook).
61. Torres, 124 S. Ct. at 919 (mem.) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition for
certiorari).
62. Id. at 920.
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rights granted in self-executing treaties, as the Vienna Convention.63
Given that the U.S. ratified the Optional Protocol, the U.S., and, by virtue
of the Supremacy Clause, the several states, are bound by the ICJ's
"authoritative" interpretation of the Vienna Convention offered in
LaGrand, as well as the interpretation that would be forthcoming in
Avena.64 And, in response to those who argue that deference to the ICJ is
tantamount to ceding U.S. judicial power to a "foreign" court,61 Justice
Breyer eloquently answers,
While this [contention that the U.S. Constitution vests judicial power
exclusively in the federal courts and argument that a treaty cannot
delegate Art. III judicial powers to the ICJ] is undeniably correct as a
general matter, it fails to address the question whether the ICJ has been
granted the authority, by means of treaties to which the United States is
a party, to interpret the rights conferred by the Vienna Convention.
The answer to Lord Ellenborough's famous rhetorical question, "Can
the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world?"
may well be yes, where the world has conferred such binding authority
through treaty. It is this kind of authority that Torres and Mexico argue
the United States has granted to the ICJ when it comes to interpreting
the rights and obligations set forth in the Vienna Convention.
Justice Breyer thus believes that Torres' petition raises fundamental legal
questions that demand the Court's keen engagement and attention.
Indeed, in the Term that just began in October 2004, the Court is
poising to become a more engaged, public participant in an evolving
judicial global conversation concerning Vienna Convention rights. In
another Avena case, that of Mr. Jos6 Medellifn, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the application of a procedural default rule to bar Mr.
Medellfn from enjoying meaningful "review and reconsideration" of his
Vienna Convention claims and thus did not follow the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals' lead. 6' The Fifth Circuit reasoned that it was bound bythe Supreme Court's decision in Breard,6 and even though the ICJ decided
63. Torres, 124 S. Ct. at 564 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. Thus, Justice Breyer would prefer to defer a decision on the petition pending a
decision in the Avena case, as well as further briefing from the United States and
"individuals expert in the subject of international law." Id. at 565.
65. The United States, in a brief in opposition to habeas petitions filed in two other Avena
cases, notes, "the ICJ does not exercise any judicial power of the United States, which is
vested exclusively by the Constitution in the United States federal courts." Id. at 565.
66. Id. at 565 (citations omitted).
67. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004).
68. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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both Avena and LaGrand in the interim, it would not depart from
Supreme Court precedent absent further Supreme Court guidance." Mr.
MedellIfn filed a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted on December
10, 2004.70 The Court's ultimate decision in the Medellin case will likely
reveal much about how the Court envisions its role in this evolving
transnational legal dialogue and may indicate whether the Court intends to
assume a markedly "transnationalist" or "nationalist" posture in future
decisions."
B. International Lawmaking and Transnational Legal Process
The Torres saga also offers insight into how international law is made
in practice, as opposed to how it is purportedly made in the international
law textbooks. International law is a process - it is often a complex story.
Too often, international legal scholars gravitate to formal legal constructs
- such as treaties - to find the law." In the instant example, the
codification and entry into force of the Vienna Convention - a treaty - was
certainly not the climax of the story involving consular protection rights.
This is not to deny the existence of international law but rather to
emphasize that it is an iterative process, distinct in many ways from
domestic lawmaking processes.
Some scholars, most prominently Harold Hongju Koh, package this
phenomenon as "transnational legal process."" Others, including one of
69. Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280. Recall that Breard was the Supreme Court's response, and
rejection, of the ICJ's provisional order requesting a stay of Mr. Breard's execution; the
ICJ's decision in Breard was not a substantive interpretation of the Vienna Convention's
consular notification rights in light of U.S. procedural bar rules but rather a provisional
order requesting that the U.S. Supreme Court stay an execution pending an ICJ decision on
the merits of the Vienna Convention claims. Thus, one could reasonably argue that the
Supreme Court's decision in Breard is not a rebuke of the ICJ's interpretation of Article 36
on the merits but rather a rejection of an ICJ provisional order. The ICJ did not issue the
LaGrand decision, its first interpretation of the Vienna Convention claims on the merits,
until June 2001, more than three years following the Supreme Court's Breard decision.
70. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Medelifn v. Dretke, 2004 WL 2851246 (Aug. 18, 2004),
cert. granted, Medellin, 125 S. Ct. 686 (mem.) (2004).
71. Oral argument in Medellin is schedule for March 28, 2005.
72. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. n.7 (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that
treaties and other intergovernmental institutions that treaties constitute dominate scholarly
discourse) [hereinafter A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking].
73. The domestic and international process of defining an international rule, refining the
international rule, incorporating international rules into domestic legal systems, and
enforcing international rules as domestic laws, engages a multitude of transnational actors
that repeatedly interact in various forums, coalesce in a type of epistemic community, and
ultimately reconstitute state interests in support of the international rule. See Harold
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the participants on this panel, Paul Schiff Berman, offer a distinct "law and
globalization" view of international law and lawmaking.74 And still others
view international lawmaking, especially in some of the more technical,
regulatory areas, as a process of transnational networking, sometimes even
creating networks of networks.75 Whatever the theoretical gloss and
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
(reviewing ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995)) [hereinafter Why
Do Nations Obey International Law?]; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995); Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American
Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International
Human Rights Law Enforced, 74 IND. L.J. 1397 (1999); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998
Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REV. 623 (1998); Harold
Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996). Koh defines
"transnational actors" as: individuals, corporations, non-governmental entities, public-
interest organizations, sub-governmental entities, regional organizations, and international
bodies. Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, supra, at 2626.
[Transnational legal process] can be viewed as having three phases. One
or more transnational actors provokes an interaction (or series of
interactions) with another, which forces an interpretation or enunciation
of the global norm applicable to the situation. By so doing, the moving
party seeks not simply to coerce the other party, but to internalize the
new interpretation of the international norm into the other party's
internal normative system. The aim is to "bind" that other party to obey
the interpretation as part of its internal value set .... The transaction
generates a legal rule which will guide future transnational interactions
between the parties; future transactions will further internalize those
norms; and eventually, repeated participation in the process will help to
reconstitute the interests and even the identities of the participants in the
process.
Id at 2646.
74. See Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (forthcoming 2005) (arguing that international law demands
"interdisciplinary study of... processes of international, transnational, and subnational
norm development and interpretation" and that the new scholarship should be "truly
interdisciplinary, drawing on insights not only of international relations theorists, but also
of anthropologists, sociologists, critical geographers, and cultural studies scholars.") (on file
with author); see also generally Paul Schiff Berman, Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U.
PA. L. REV. 311 (2002).
75. These scholars present a transgovernmental network theory of international
lawmaking. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041; Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Government Networks], Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global
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packaging, these scholars and the present example importantly recognize
that the notion of "international law as treaty" or "international law as
intergovernmental organization born from a treaty" is a woefully static an
underinlcusive way to conceive of the international lawmaking process.
Torres' Vienna Convention story involved a volley, of sorts, between
the ICJ, Supreme Court and lower courts. From the ICJ (Breard) to the
Supreme Court back to the ICJ (LaGrand) to the Arizona courts and back
to the ICJ (Avena) with an intervening pass from the Supreme Court to
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, as well as the Texas courts; the
ball is now literally in the Supreme Court. Yet judges and courts were not
the sole, or even the primary, characters in this story. Clearly the parole
boards and state governors played critical roles. The U.S. State
Department issued practical guides to state and local law enforcement
76
officials, addressing issues of consular notification and access, and
cautioned domestic judges and state governors to be circumspect about the
Economy Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Michael
Byers ed., 2000) [hereinafter Governing the Global Economy]. Anne-Marie Slaughter, The
Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. 19, 1997 [hereinafter The Real New World
Order]. These scholars argue that the state retains a crucial role in international lawmaking
through transgovernmental networks of similarly-situated technocrats. Thus, the state, as a
player in international lawmaking, is disaggregating and decentralizing into relatively
autonomous transgovernmental communities. Governing the Global Economy, supra, at
200 ("From this perspective, the State is not disappearing; it is disaggregating....
Disaggregation provides flexibility and networking capacity, while preserving the
fundamental attributes of Statehood."). While these transgovernmental networks may
regulate through traditional forms of international law, like treaties, they often prefer the
flexibility that informal "soft" legal instruments, such as the Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). Raustiala, supra, at 22-23 (discussing transgovernmental networks'
proclivity toward MOUs because of their effectiveness and flexibility); Governing the
Global Economy, supra, at 214 (noting that while cooperation can take place through
formal treaties, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, much cooperation is less formal,
happening through Memorandums of Understanding and informal organizations (such as
the Basle Committee and the International Organization of Securities Regulators
(IOSCO))); see also The Real New World Order, supra, at 190.
76. In fact, the ICJ in Avena noted with approval and appreciation the Department of
State's outreach and compliance efforts. See Case Concerning Avena, 2004 I.C.J. 128, at
149; see also U.S. Department of State, Consular Notification and Access January 1998:
Instructions for Federal, State, and other Local Law Enforcement and Other Officials
Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the Rights of Consular Officials To
Assist Them, available at http://www.travel.state.gov/law/notify.html (last visited on Nov.
25, 2004) [hereinafter Instructions for Federal, State, and other Local Law Enforcement
Regarding Foreign Nationals].
[Vol. 12:1
A TALE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
diplomatic implications of their decisions." The Mexican government not
only filed Avena with the ICJ, but also began a concerted public relations
and advocacy blitz, orchestrated by high-profile Wall Street lawyers; it also
implicitly threatened economic retaliation (a relatively credible threat in
states like Oklahoma, which depend heavily on trade with Mexico).78
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged politicians and business
leaders, holding press conferences and initiating letter writing campaigns] 9
Ivy League law professors and human rights advocates drafted an amicus
brief on international law for the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
and persuaded prominent Oklahomans, most notably former Oklahoma
Congressman and U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, James Jones, to join.' °
With each additional chapter in the Torres/Vienna Convention story,
the sanctity of the Vienna Convention's consular protection rights became
incrementally enmeshed in the domestic psyche.8' And, ultimately, the
77. Henry Grants Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres, supra note 47. ("[Tlhe U.S.
State Department contacted my office and urged us to give 'careful consideration' to that
fact," that the United States was a party to the Vienna Convention). The State Department
weighed in on Breard, as well ("[l]ast night the Secretary of State sent a letter to the
Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard's execution."). Breard v. Gilmore, 523
U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
78. See also Paul English, Death-Penalty Foes Plead with Henry to Spare Mexican's Life,
TUL. WORLD, May 13, 2004, at A17.
79. In the Torres case, NGOs sent letters to the Attorney General and the Pardon and
Parole Board arguing for clemency in light of Torres' Vienna Convention claims; the
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, led a delegation to plead on Torres' behalf
before the Parole Board and the Governor. Jack Monday, Mexican Envoy to Help Plead
for Inmate's Life, DAILY OKLA., May 7, 2004, at A8; see also Julie E. Bisbee, Okla. Panel
Backs Clemency for Mexican Inmate- State Feels Heat of Court Ruling, COM. APPEAL, May
8, 2004, at A4; 35 International, National, Local Organizations Hold Rally Urging Gov.
Henry to Grant Clemency to Mexican National Osvaldo Torres, U.S. NEWSWIRE, May 12,
2004.
80. See Brief of Amici Curiae for the International Law Experts and Former Diplomats in
Support of Petitioner, Torres v. Oklahoma (on file with author).
81. For example, in Breard, the Court is initially quite hostile to the ICJ's provisional
order, and Mr. Breard is executed. The State Department, acutely aware of the diplomatic
friction that Vienna-Convention-related disputes cause and also quite concerned about
reciprocal retaliation against Americans who might be detained abroad, begins a concerted
effort to enhance compliance on-the-ground so as to obviate the need for any court
intervention. Instructions for Federal, State, and other Local Law Enforcement Regarding
Foreign Nationals, supra note 76. In Valdez, an Oklahoma case following LaGrand yet
preceding Torres that was highly reminiscent of the Vienna Convention issues in Torres'
case, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, while grappling with the inequities of the
Vienna-Convention-related violations, was not yet willing to bow to the ICJ's legal
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, as articulated in LaGrand; yet, the Oklahoma
court nonetheless granted relief, not on the Vienna Convention issues but rather to prevent
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disposition of Torres' case is profoundly distinct from that of Breard's. 82
Will there be some stalling, or even a change in momentum? Mr. Medellin
may soon find out that the answer is "yes." But, Oklahoma, in breaking
new ground - in redefining the relationship between a state's highest
criminal court and treaty-based dispute resolution mechanisms that, at
times, reside in the Hague, may have provided some cover for subsequent
813
states facing Avena-like cases . For those states that do not want to be
placed in the same conundrum - either "review and reconsider" criminal
convictions or be in breach of the United States' treaty obligations -
Oklahoma's experience should ultimately encourage state executives to
collaborate with law enforcement officials to ensure that Vienna
Convention rights are granted upon detention, obviating the need for post
hoc vindication.4 And, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals'
decision in Torres provided the foil to Texas' approach in Medellin,
offering the seemingly requisite impetus for the Supreme Court's granting
of certiorari in the Medellin case.
a fundamental "miscarriage of justice." Valdez, 46 P.3d at 710; see also supra note 41 for
further discussion of Valdez.
82. It is certainly important to mention the geo-political backdrop against which Torres' case
climaxed in April/May 2004, one year into the Iraq war. Whether warranted or not, the
international community did not at that moment consider the U.S. to be an international -law-
abiding member. It is no accident that the Oklahoma Parole Board, Court of Criminal Appeals and
Governor made respective Torres-related decisions with the Abu Ghraib prison scandal unfolding
in the background. See Victor Davis Hanson, Abu Ghraib, WALL ST. J., May 3, 2004, at A2;
Thom Shanker & Jacques Steinberg, The Struggle for Iraq: Captives; Bush Voices 'Disgust' at
Abuse of Iraqi Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2004, at Al. At a moment when the international
community saw certain members of the United States military violating Geneva Convention
obligations, officials in Oklahoma City may have, consciously or subconsciously, attempted to re-
sanctify the U.S. as a treaty-abiding nation - in this case the Vienna Convention rather than
Geneva Convention - as an attempt to heal some of the domestic and international damage that
Abu Ghraib created. See, e.g., Harold Honju Koh, The Ninth Annual John W. Hager
Lecture, the 2004 Term: The Supreme Court Meets International Law, 12 TULSA COMP.
& INT'L L. J. 1 (2004) (remarks in this issue).
83. Kim Cobb, Parole Board Votes to Spare Life of Mexican, Hous. CHRON., May 8, 2004,
at 3 ("David Dow, who represents condemned Texas inmate Cesar Fierro, also a Mexican
citizen, said he doubts the Oklahoma case will sway the decision-making process in Texas
or other states. 'At the same time, I think it will give them some cover,' Dow said. 'I think
it's useful for other boards not to have to be the first one to decide that this order from the
International Court of Justice is binding."').
84. Criminal defense lawyers are revising practitioner guides to include Vienna
Convention rights (and violations) on direct appeal checklists so that "procedural default"
will no longer be an issue. See, e.g., Meghan H. Morgan, Case Note, Torres v. Mullin, 124
S.Ct. 562 (2003) (mem.) (Breyer, J., Dissenting from a Denial of Certiorari), 16 CAP. DEF. J.
609, 613 (2004).
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C. State Courts as Transnational Actors
International law is a process involving a multitude of actors. While it
is certainly interesting and important to reflect in forums such as these on
the Supreme Court's role in this process, one should not underestimate the
multidimensional, multifaceted role of other transnational actors in
constituting international law. In particular, state courts are clearly
transnational, not mere parochial, actors; yet their role in solidifying
international norms and furthering compliance with international law is
woefully underappreciated.85  When the Vienna Convention story has
concluded - and it is far from over - I have no doubt that the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, Judge Chapel, in particular, will retain a
prominent place as an innovator and leader in matters of international
86law. Conceiving of state courts as transnational actors raises two
derivative questions: 1) why have international scholars largely neglected
the role of state courts? and 2) should the scholar-practitioner make any
attendant changes in advocacy tactics?
One can only speculate on the first question. In part, scholars and
practitioners' neglect of state courts may be a product of some intellectual
myopia. The giants of international law typically reside in the political or
economic power centers, often affiliated with the nation's most prestigious
law schools, where the Supreme Court and federal appellate decisions
dominate almost all casebooks, and where students learn that the most
prestigious post-law-school jobs are federal court clerkships. That state
courts are largely overlooked transnational legal actors is likely just a
specific manifestation of a much broader reality - in elite legal circles, state
courts are more generally neglected, or treated as an afterthought.
Furthermore, the role of state courts as transnational actors is
regrettably caught in the cross-wind of several of the most contentious
debates within the international legal academy, particularly those
85. There are admittedly some scholars who discuss the role of state courts in compliance
with international law, but these scholars typically see state courts as placing limits on
international law - as reigning it in - rather than being the progressive champions of
international law and tend to argue that state law, as opposed to federal, treaty-based law,
controls in certain situations. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The State of New York Does Exist:
How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 457 (2004).
86. See Justice Higgins, Remarks at the Yale Law School Alumni Weekend (Oct. 8, 2004),
at
http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Alumni-Affairs/alumniwkendavO4.htm (last visited
on Nov. 26, 2004) (Yale Law School Alumni Weekend, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT)
(noting that sometimes state courts, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, and offering other
European examples, will step ahead of constitutional courts and make decisions that
profoundly impact the evolution of international law).
2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
regarding the domestic legal status of customary international law, federal
pre-eminence in foreign affairs and international law, and substantive
limitations on the Constitution's Article II treaty power. Those who view
international law as a process engaging a multitude of transnational actors
(state courts presumably included) also tend to defend a view of the U.S.
Constitution whereby the federal government and federal courts remain
importantly dominant in questions of international law and diplomacy,
concomitantly emphasizing federal courts and federal law in scholarship
and advocacy. 7 State courts thereby recede in the analysis, often out of
benign neglect.
On the other hand, one might expect scholars who argue that
customary international law is not part of any "federal common law,"' n or
who favor substantive limitations on the executive branch's ability to bind
the states through treaties," to also champion the role of states, state
courts in particular, in furthering international law. Yet these same
scholars tend to reject a win-win, process-oriented view of international
law in favor of a zero-sum view, whereby fiercely "competing sovereigns"
- states, the federal government, foreign states, and international bodies -
vie for "the right to control America's judicial destiny." 9° These scholars
see states and state courts not as transnational actors but rather as
87. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824, 1849 (1998) ("One need not denigrate the ability or impartiality of state court
judges to recognize that the federal judges have structural attributes that make them more
appropriate adjudicators to rule on international matters that may embroil the nation in
foreign policy disputes.").
88. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARv. L. REV. 815 (1997);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of
International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998).
89. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism (pt. 1), 97
MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism
(pt. 2), 99 MICH. L. REv. 98 (2000).
90. I attribute this observation to Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, supra note
55, at 56:
In this transnational legal process, the several states, foreign governments,
and international bodies do not represent competing sovereigns, all vying
for the right to control America's judicial destiny. Rather, a
transnationalist jurisprudence suggests, the United States expresses its
national sovereignty not by blocking out all foreign influence but by
vigorous "participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the
international system."
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transnational detractors.91 A court, like the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals, that operates synergistically with international courts, the U.S.
Department of State, foreign diplomats, and NGOs would not likely be
among their favored examples.
If state courts are important transnational actors, what does this
suggest about advocacy tactics? Judges, and not merely state judges for
that matter, sometimes misstate even the most fundamental tenets of
international law92 and simply must receive more training in international
law. So it is crucial that lawyers, who advocate before such judges,
understand their briefs not only as advocacy opportunities but also as
opportunities to instruct courts in the legal dynamics of international law.
Accordingly, all lawyers, not just those elite international law professors
and those affiliated with certain NGOs, should become familiar with basic
international law concepts (with strong implications, of course, for law
school curricula).93 Similarly, while Supreme Court advocacy certainly has
a "sizzle," NGOs and international law advocacy clinics should turn some
energy from filing Supreme Court amicus briefs to filing amicus briefs
before the state courts that will often be the first, or primary, judicial touch
point with cutting edge issues of international law. Judge Chapel, and his
91. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 85, at 506-11 (noting state efforts to stymie implementation of
the Vienna Convention rights, most notably those of Florida).
92. For example, some judges (or even Justices) do not understand the legal distinction
between signing a treaty and ratifying a treaty. Torres, 124 S. Ct. at 564 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting opinion, denial of petition for writ of certiorari) (noting that the United States
has "signed" the Optional Protocol and thereby must abide by the ICJ's decision); however,
in reality, a mere signature would not necessarily lead to this conclusion, see Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 art. 18; Justice
Breyer's argument would have been stronger had he correctly noted that the United States
had ratified the Optional Protocol. In the Torres concurrence, Judge Chapel, in a footnote,
distinguishes the ICJ's Nicaragua litigation from the Avena case because "plaintiffs were
not parties to the International Court of Justice decision [in the Nicaragua case], and the
treaties relied on were not self-executing. By contrast, Avena applies directly to Torres's
case, and the Vienna Convention is self-executing through the Optional Protocol." Torres,
No. PCD-04-442, at n.18 (Chapel, J., concurring). Of course, this quote shows limited
understanding of which parties may legitimately bring cases before the ICJ - namely states
(Torres was not a party before the ICJ; Mexico was on his behalf) - and the Optional
Protocol does not, in and of itself, make the Vienna Convention self-executing; the
Optional Protocol is a dispute resolution clause that binds states - in this case the U.S. and
Mexico. The self-executing question is relevant when determining whether a domestic
court, for example the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, may entertain Vienna-
Convention-based arguments without any underlying state or federal statute that codifies
Vienna Convention rights.
93. The American Association of Law Schools will conduct a workshop entitled Integrating
Transnational Perspectives into the First Year Curriculum in conjunction with its 2006 Annual
Meeting.
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law clerks, relied heavily on an amicus brief on behalf of experts in
international law and former diplomats,94 as evidenced by Judge Chapel's
echoing of many of the cases and arguments appearing in that brief.5
Regrettably, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals' receipt of an amicus
brief in Torres was a stark aberration from standard practice, rather than
the rule.96 Finally, federal judges and foreign judges must recognize state
court judges as co-participants in the making and shaping of international
legal norms and should open their cross-border judicial conversations -
both formal (opinion-writing and cross-citing of foreign and international
law) and informal (hobnobbing at conferences and foreign study abroad
programs) - to include their state counterparts.
IV. CONCLUSION: A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING
Torres illustrates that state courts matter in the solidifying,
interpreting, and application of international norms. Yet, the international
lawmaking stories that gain scholarly and popular traction are of a
different genre - international law is a treaty, like the Vienna Convention,
and the crucial legal interpretive work flows from intergovernmental
institutions, like the ICJ. In these stories, international law evolves from
the "top-down," from the vantage point of a formal legal instrument. Yet,
often out of the limelight, international law unfolds from the "bottom-up,"
on a more grass-roots, in-the-trenches level. Elsewhere, I have identified
this phenomenon in the context of international trade finance
practitioners, who constitute and interpret transnational norms that
ultimately are appropriated by more formal legal regimes. Likewise, in
the context of the Vienna Convention, state courts, as they grapple with
the international legal issues that might arise in criminal prosecutions, as
they manage the on-the-ground exigencies of the criminal justice system,
94. Brief of Arnici Curiae International Law Experts and Former Diplomats in Support of
Petitioner, Torres v. State of Oklahoma (Case No. PCD-040442) (May 4, 2004) (on file with
author).
95. This dynamic - amicus brief argument finding its way into judicial opinions - was
mentioned in Sean Murphy, Implementation of Avena Decision by Oklahoma Court, 98
AM. J. INT'L L. 581 n.13 (2004).
96. When asked whether their chambers receive many amicus briefs, Judge Chapel's law
clerk Lou Kohlman answered "rarely," and further admitted how helpful the amicus brief
was in researching the international law issues. Interview with Lou Kohlman, Law Clerk,
Chambers of the Honorable Charles Chapel, in Tulsa, Okla. (October 21, 2004) (on file
with author).
97. A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking, supra note 72.
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and as they balance the relationship between local, state, and federal
governments, significantly contribute to the international lawmaking
process. These state decisions - state practices - percolate, at times
inconsistently and at times at cross-purposes, to constitute, or refine,
international norms.
In the instant example the intersection of bottom-up and top-down
lawmaking processes becomes a particularly powerful, combustive
moment for international law. The Vienna Convention was undoubtedly a
great international law achievement, and certainly the ICJ's
interpretations, particularly in LaGrand and Avena, importantly add to the
Vienna Convention's texture and illuminate some of its contours. Yet, it
was not until a little-known, little-appreciated court in Oklahoma, in the
course of dealing with what initially appeared a run-of-the-mill capital
case, collided head-on with the ICJ (by virtue of Torres being a member of
the Avena group), and was thereby forced to tackle the relationship
between state procedural bar laws, treaties and the Supremacy Clause, that
Vienna Convention mandates became solidified and legitimated as actual,
enforceable, on-the-ground rules of practice. Indeed, this Vienna
Convention story, involves two plots - one beginning in Oklahoma
criminal courts - the other beginning with Breard and continuing through
Avena at the Hague. Their meeting - intertwining - is certainly a very
significant moment. Whether this moment will be eclipsed by the Supreme
Court's forthcoming decision in Medellin is yet to be determined.
Regardless, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals undoubtedly wrote
a crucial, if not the critical, chapter in the unfolding Vienna Convention
narrative.
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